8ededc50a997e010a3cd2ed76e7689cc3865e18a
8
Commits
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7d4e512cb0 |
fix: address review findings on fetch-url-tool
- fetch_url: revalidate allowlist on every redirect hop (fixes SSRF where 302 to disallowed host / 169.254.169.254 / file:// bypassed the url_allowlist). Stream response body with iter_bytes and cap at 1MB so a multi-GB response from an allowlisted host cannot OOM the service. Reuses the manual-redirect-loop pattern from yarn_client. - list_applications: stop swallowing 404 (YARN returns 200+empty for "no match"; 404 means the RM doesn't support the endpoint — surface the YarnError instead of hiding it as an empty result). Add Field(ge=1, le=10000) to ListApplicationsRequest.limit so a runaway limit is rejected at the Pydantic layer with 422. - save_connection: PATCH semantics for existing records. Re-route to update_connection when the name already exists so partial updates (e.g. only master) no longer wipe url_allowlist back to []. Uses an _UNSET sentinel in the tool function to distinguish "omitted" from "None" without breaking the existing parameter list. - README: drop leading space on 5 new connection-tool table rows that was breaking GitHub Flavored Markdown table continuity. - Indentation: normalize connections.py and requests.py to 4-space indent (auth_password/auth_principal/auth_keytab were 3-space). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7fbad97a87 |
feat: add list_applications tool for YARN application enumeration
Add a new MCP tool that queries YARN's /ws/v1/cluster/apps endpoint
through a named Connection, returning a list of ApplicationSummary
records. Bypasses the local JobStore — useful for enumerating apps
that were not submitted through this service.
API:
list_applications(
connection_name: str, # required, which YARN cluster
state: str | None = None, # YARN state filter: NEW/NEW_SAVING/
# SUBMITTED/ACCEPTED/RUNNING/
# FINISHED/FAILED/KILLED
queue: str | None = None, # YARN queue filter
limit: int = 100, # cap on returned apps (YARN has no
# offset-based pagination; combine
# state/queue filters for big clusters)
) -> list[ApplicationSummary]
Implementation:
- yarn_client.list_applications(config, *, state, queue, limit) -> list[dict]
Returns raw YARN app dicts; raises YarnError on 4xx/5xx; returns
[] on 404 (no apps match). Uses the existing _request helper,
which now accepts a "params" kwarg for query strings (one-line
additive change).
- external_jobs.list_applications(connection_name, state, queue, limit)
-> list[ApplicationSummary]. Looks up the Connection, builds the
YarnClientConfig, calls the yarn_client function, maps each raw
YARN dict to ApplicationSummary (mirroring the manual field-mapping
style of get_job_result). The yarn_client function is imported
as "list_applications_yarn" to avoid name collision.
- ApplicationSummary: 12-field Pydantic model with snake_case names
(application_id, name, user, queue, state, final_status,
application_type, application_tags, started_time, finished_time,
tracking_url, progress). Unused YARN fields (memorySeconds,
vcoreSeconds, preemptedResource*, etc.) are not exposed.
- ListApplicationsRequest: Pydantic body model with Field(description=)
for LLM-facing schema.
- /list_applications route registered with operation_id=
"list_applications", placed next to the other external YARN tools.
Tests:
- 8 new unit tests in test_external_jobs.py (happy path, state/queue/
limit pass-through, default limit, empty list, missing connection,
full field mapping).
- test_mcp_routes.py: assert 23 tool routes.
- README: list_applications row added to the Spark Executor table.
Tests: 390 passed (was 382, +8 net).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a5b9539663 |
refactor(fetch_url): trust the allowlist, rename to url_allowlist
Two changes:
1) Drop every check except the allowlist lookup.
Old _validate_url_host did: scheme check, host-presence check,
IP-literal check, empty-allowlist check, then glob match.
New _validate_url_host does: parse host, return on glob match,
raise on miss. That's it. The only remaining structural check is
'the URL must have a host' (otherwise the glob has nothing to
test against).
Security implication: scheme (file://, gopher://, ftp://) and
IP literals (10.0.0.1, ::1) are NO LONGER rejected by the
validator. The allowlist is the single source of truth. If the
user writes ['*.*.*.*'], they have opted in to 4-label hosts
including IP literals; if they write ['ccam*'], they get ccam1-
ccam99 and nothing else. The default ['ccam*'] / [] pattern is
tight by construction.
Removed: import ipaddress, the scheme/IP rejection branches, the
'allowlist empty' explicit branch (the empty list naturally
matches nothing).
2) Rename allowed_url_hosts -> url_allowlist.
The previous name was a verbose double-negative ('allowed ... hosts').
The new name is short, modern (allowlist > whitelist), and matches
the pattern of the field (URL hosts allowed). Renamed in:
- Connection (models.py)
- SaveConnectionRequest, UpdateConnectionRequest, FetchUrlRequest
(requests.py)
- _validate_url_host, _host_matches_any_glob parameters
(fetch_url.py)
- save_connection / update_connection call sites and error
messages (connections.py, fetch_url.py)
- Route descriptions (server.py)
- All test files
- README
No backward-compat alias: the field was added in
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6d7387b022 |
feat: simplify fetch_url allowlist + add update_connection tool
Part 1 — fetch_url validation simplification
Now that Connection.allowed_url_hosts exists, it's the ONLY check.
The old 2-label suffix-overlap rule against yarn_rm_url is gone.
- Connection.allowed_url_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
(was list[str] | None = None). Default empty list means the
connection has no fetch access; the user must explicitly opt in
via save_connection or update_connection.
- _validate_url_host drops the yarn_rm_url parameter and the
_host_suffix_overlap helper. Now: scheme/host/IP checks, then
empty-reject, then glob match. Reject everything else.
- fetch_url's error message now points the user at
Connection.allowed_url_hosts as the fix.
- The label-by-label glob check from the previous commit is kept
(SSRF guard: 'ccam*' matches 'ccam50' but NOT 'ccam50.evil.com').
Part 2 — update_connection tool
PATCH-style update for an existing Connection record. Only the
fields the caller provides are changed. Same pattern as
update_pending_job: req.model_dump(exclude_none=True), with
'name' popped before passing to the store.
To CLEAR a field (e.g. drop auth_password), use delete_connection
+ save_connection. This is YAGNI; the alternative (model_fields_set
to distinguish 'omitted' from 'null') adds surface for bugs.
- ConnectionStore.update(name, **fields): get, model_copy(update=...),
save. Lock + atomic write. Re-validates the patched record.
- update_connection tool function: passes fields through to the
store, logs which fields were changed.
- UpdateConnectionRequest Pydantic model: 12 mutable fields + name.
- /update_connection route with operation_id='update_connection'.
- 9 new unit tests in test_connection_tools.py (PATCH, dict/list
replace-not-merge, unknown name 404, validation of patched record,
disk persistence).
- test_fetch_url.py: existing 21 tests updated; 3 new tests for
the empty/None/missing allowed_url_hosts cases.
- test_mcp_routes.py: assert 22 tool routes.
- README: update_connection row added; fetch_url row updated.
Tests: 386 passed (up from 377, +9 net).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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0291f36b01 |
feat(fetch_url): per-Connection allowed_url_hosts glob allowlist
The default 'URL host shares >= 2 labels of suffix with yarn_rm_url host' rule is too strict for clusters whose hostnames are single-label (e.g. 'ccam1' through 'ccam99'). The user's cluster is reachable at http://ccam1:8088, and they want fetch_url to work for any ccamN host — but ccam1 and ccam50 share 0 suffix labels, so the existing rule rejects everything. Add an opt-in allowlist field on Connection: allowed_url_hosts: list[str] | None Each entry is an fnmatch glob pattern. The URL host is allowed if it matches ANY pattern, regardless of the suffix rule. Save a Connection with ['ccam*'] to allow ccam1, ccam2, ..., ccam99. SSRF safety: the implementation does NOT use vanilla fnmatch on the flat host string (because '*' in fnmatch crosses '.', so 'ccam*' would match 'ccam50.evil.com' — a security hole). Instead, both the pattern and the host are split on '.' and matched LABEL-BY-LABEL with the label counts required to match exactly. So 'ccam*' matches 'ccam50' but NOT 'ccam50.evil.com' (different label counts). Test coverage: - 8 new tests in tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py (glob allow, glob deny, dot-boundary SSRF test, multiple globs, empty list, None fallback, error message hint) - All 21 fetch_url tests pass; 377 total. - spark_executor/models.py: Connection.allowed_url_hosts (with description) - spark_executor/tools/requests.py: SaveConnectionRequest.allowed_url_hosts - spark_executor/tools/fetch_url.py: new _host_matches_any_glob helper; _validate_url_host now takes allowed_hosts and checks globs BEFORE the suffix rule - tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py: 8 new tests - README.md: fetch_url row mentions the allowlist Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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627e70f697 |
feat: add fetch_url tool for proxying HTTP GET to cluster-internal URLs
Add a new MCP tool that lets the agent fetch URLs on the cluster's
network (YARN tracking UI, Spark History Server, NodeManager web UIs)
when the agent is on a different network and cannot reach those hosts
directly.
The MCP service runs on the YARN RM node, so it can reach every host
the cluster knows about — the agent just needs a way to ask.
Security: SSRF guard via host suffix overlap
- URL host must share >= 2 labels of suffix with the named
Connection's yarn_rm_url host (e.g. yarn_rm_url='rm.prod.internal'
allows 'http://nm01.prod.internal/...')
- IP literals (10.0.0.1, ::1) rejected
- Non-http(s) schemes (file://, gopher://, ftp://) rejected
- Connection with no yarn_rm_url cannot use this tool
- Reuses Connection.auth_for_httpx() and verify_for_httpx() so the
agent does not need cluster credentials
- Response body capped at 1 MB (truncated=true if larger)
- 30s timeout, follows redirects, loguru INFO audit log on every call
- spark_executor/tools/fetch_url.py: new tool + 2 helpers
(_host_suffix_overlap, _validate_url_host)
- spark_executor/models.py: FetchUrlResult Pydantic model
- spark_executor/tools/requests.py: FetchUrlRequest with descriptions
- spark_executor/server.py: /fetch_url route, operation_id='fetch_url'
- tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py: 13 unit tests covering all guards,
truncation, auth/SSL pass-through, redirect follow
- tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py: assert 21 tool routes
- README.md: 1 row in Spark Executor 工具 table
Tests: 369 passed (up from 356).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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6cf68439a2 |
feat: add external job tools + improve LLM-facing tool descriptions
Add 3 new MCP tools for inspecting YARN applications NOT submitted through this service: get_external_job_logs, get_external_job_status, get_external_job_result. Each takes application_id + connection_name and queries YARN directly, bypassing the local JobStore. - spark_executor/tools/external_jobs.py: 3 tool functions - spark_executor/tools/requests.py: 3 new Pydantic body models (ExternalJobLogsRequest, ExternalJobStatusRequest, ExternalJobResultRequest) - spark_executor/server.py: 3 new POST routes with explicit operation_id - tests/unit/test_external_jobs.py: 7 unit tests - tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py: assert 20 tool routes - README.md: list the 3 new tools To make the LLM pick the right tool and not guess at field values, also: - Add Pydantic field descriptions for 22 fields across 8 request models (SaveConnectionRequest, UpdatePendingJobRequest, GetJobLogsRequest, JobIdRequest, PendingIdRequest, ConnectionNameRequest, plus the new ExternalJob*Request models). - Update 12 route descriptions with cross-references, prerequisite context, and 400 behavior notes. - Refactor _unknown_job_error: an input that looks like a YARN application_id (starts with 'application_') now returns HTTP 400 (ValueError) with a hint message naming the right external tool; other not-found cases still return 404 (KeyError). This catches the common LLM mistake of passing application_id to the internal get_job_* / kill_job tools. - 4 new unit tests for the 400 behavior. Tests: 356 passed (up from 242). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e285dc0f66 | feat: add README.md |