Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 a5b9539663 refactor(fetch_url): trust the allowlist, rename to url_allowlist
Two changes:

1) Drop every check except the allowlist lookup.

  Old _validate_url_host did: scheme check, host-presence check,
  IP-literal check, empty-allowlist check, then glob match.

  New _validate_url_host does: parse host, return on glob match,
  raise on miss. That's it. The only remaining structural check is
  'the URL must have a host' (otherwise the glob has nothing to
  test against).

  Security implication: scheme (file://, gopher://, ftp://) and
  IP literals (10.0.0.1, ::1) are NO LONGER rejected by the
  validator. The allowlist is the single source of truth. If the
  user writes ['*.*.*.*'], they have opted in to 4-label hosts
  including IP literals; if they write ['ccam*'], they get ccam1-
  ccam99 and nothing else. The default ['ccam*'] / [] pattern is
  tight by construction.

  Removed: import ipaddress, the scheme/IP rejection branches, the
  'allowlist empty' explicit branch (the empty list naturally
  matches nothing).

2) Rename allowed_url_hosts -> url_allowlist.

  The previous name was a verbose double-negative ('allowed ... hosts').
  The new name is short, modern (allowlist > whitelist), and matches
  the pattern of the field (URL hosts allowed). Renamed in:
    - Connection (models.py)
    - SaveConnectionRequest, UpdateConnectionRequest, FetchUrlRequest
      (requests.py)
    - _validate_url_host, _host_matches_any_glob parameters
      (fetch_url.py)
    - save_connection / update_connection call sites and error
      messages (connections.py, fetch_url.py)
    - Route descriptions (server.py)
    - All test files
    - README

  No backward-compat alias: the field was added in 0291f36 and
  hasn't shipped, so no production migration. Local dev data
  (data/connections.json, gitignored) with allowed_url_hosts set
  will be silently dropped by Pydantic v2 (default for extra
  fields is ignore) — those connections lose their allowlist and
  fetch_url will reject everything until re-saved.

Test cleanup:
  - Removed 9 obsolete tests (scheme/IP/suffix rejection)
  - Renamed allowed_url_hosts -> url_allowlist in 11 surviving tests
  - Added 4 new tests documenting the 'allowlist is the only gate'
    model: IP literal accepted, HTTPS accepted, no-host rejected,
    empty allowlist rejected, error message mentions url_allowlist

  -1 obsolete test, net -4 from 386 -> 382 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 12:09:41 +08:00
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 6d7387b022 feat: simplify fetch_url allowlist + add update_connection tool
Part 1 — fetch_url validation simplification
  Now that Connection.allowed_url_hosts exists, it's the ONLY check.
  The old 2-label suffix-overlap rule against yarn_rm_url is gone.

  - Connection.allowed_url_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
    (was list[str] | None = None). Default empty list means the
    connection has no fetch access; the user must explicitly opt in
    via save_connection or update_connection.
  - _validate_url_host drops the yarn_rm_url parameter and the
    _host_suffix_overlap helper. Now: scheme/host/IP checks, then
    empty-reject, then glob match. Reject everything else.
  - fetch_url's error message now points the user at
    Connection.allowed_url_hosts as the fix.
  - The label-by-label glob check from the previous commit is kept
    (SSRF guard: 'ccam*' matches 'ccam50' but NOT 'ccam50.evil.com').

Part 2 — update_connection tool
  PATCH-style update for an existing Connection record. Only the
  fields the caller provides are changed. Same pattern as
  update_pending_job: req.model_dump(exclude_none=True), with
  'name' popped before passing to the store.

  To CLEAR a field (e.g. drop auth_password), use delete_connection
  + save_connection. This is YAGNI; the alternative (model_fields_set
  to distinguish 'omitted' from 'null') adds surface for bugs.

  - ConnectionStore.update(name, **fields): get, model_copy(update=...),
    save. Lock + atomic write. Re-validates the patched record.
  - update_connection tool function: passes fields through to the
    store, logs which fields were changed.
  - UpdateConnectionRequest Pydantic model: 12 mutable fields + name.
  - /update_connection route with operation_id='update_connection'.
  - 9 new unit tests in test_connection_tools.py (PATCH, dict/list
    replace-not-merge, unknown name 404, validation of patched record,
    disk persistence).
  - test_fetch_url.py: existing 21 tests updated; 3 new tests for
    the empty/None/missing allowed_url_hosts cases.
  - test_mcp_routes.py: assert 22 tool routes.
  - README: update_connection row added; fetch_url row updated.

Tests: 386 passed (up from 377, +9 net).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 11:46:07 +08:00
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 0291f36b01 feat(fetch_url): per-Connection allowed_url_hosts glob allowlist
The default 'URL host shares >= 2 labels of suffix with yarn_rm_url
host' rule is too strict for clusters whose hostnames are single-label
(e.g. 'ccam1' through 'ccam99'). The user's cluster is reachable at
http://ccam1:8088, and they want fetch_url to work for any ccamN
host — but ccam1 and ccam50 share 0 suffix labels, so the existing
rule rejects everything.

Add an opt-in allowlist field on Connection:

  allowed_url_hosts: list[str] | None

Each entry is an fnmatch glob pattern. The URL host is allowed if it
matches ANY pattern, regardless of the suffix rule. Save a Connection
with ['ccam*'] to allow ccam1, ccam2, ..., ccam99.

SSRF safety: the implementation does NOT use vanilla fnmatch on the
flat host string (because '*' in fnmatch crosses '.', so 'ccam*' would
match 'ccam50.evil.com' — a security hole). Instead, both the pattern
and the host are split on '.' and matched LABEL-BY-LABEL with the
label counts required to match exactly. So 'ccam*' matches 'ccam50'
but NOT 'ccam50.evil.com' (different label counts).

Test coverage:
- 8 new tests in tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py (glob allow, glob deny,
  dot-boundary SSRF test, multiple globs, empty list, None fallback,
  error message hint)
- All 21 fetch_url tests pass; 377 total.

- spark_executor/models.py: Connection.allowed_url_hosts (with description)
- spark_executor/tools/requests.py: SaveConnectionRequest.allowed_url_hosts
- spark_executor/tools/fetch_url.py: new _host_matches_any_glob helper;
  _validate_url_host now takes allowed_hosts and checks globs BEFORE
  the suffix rule
- tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py: 8 new tests
- README.md: fetch_url row mentions the allowlist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 11:22:55 +08:00
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 627e70f697 feat: add fetch_url tool for proxying HTTP GET to cluster-internal URLs
Add a new MCP tool that lets the agent fetch URLs on the cluster's
network (YARN tracking UI, Spark History Server, NodeManager web UIs)
when the agent is on a different network and cannot reach those hosts
directly.

The MCP service runs on the YARN RM node, so it can reach every host
the cluster knows about — the agent just needs a way to ask.

Security: SSRF guard via host suffix overlap
  - URL host must share >= 2 labels of suffix with the named
    Connection's yarn_rm_url host (e.g. yarn_rm_url='rm.prod.internal'
    allows 'http://nm01.prod.internal/...')
  - IP literals (10.0.0.1, ::1) rejected
  - Non-http(s) schemes (file://, gopher://, ftp://) rejected
  - Connection with no yarn_rm_url cannot use this tool
- Reuses Connection.auth_for_httpx() and verify_for_httpx() so the
  agent does not need cluster credentials
- Response body capped at 1 MB (truncated=true if larger)
- 30s timeout, follows redirects, loguru INFO audit log on every call

- spark_executor/tools/fetch_url.py: new tool + 2 helpers
  (_host_suffix_overlap, _validate_url_host)
- spark_executor/models.py: FetchUrlResult Pydantic model
- spark_executor/tools/requests.py: FetchUrlRequest with descriptions
- spark_executor/server.py: /fetch_url route, operation_id='fetch_url'
- tests/unit/test_fetch_url.py: 13 unit tests covering all guards,
  truncation, auth/SSL pass-through, redirect follow
- tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py: assert 21 tool routes
- README.md: 1 row in Spark Executor 工具 table

Tests: 369 passed (up from 356).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 10:59:25 +08:00
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 6cf68439a2 feat: add external job tools + improve LLM-facing tool descriptions
Add 3 new MCP tools for inspecting YARN applications NOT submitted
through this service: get_external_job_logs, get_external_job_status,
get_external_job_result. Each takes application_id + connection_name
and queries YARN directly, bypassing the local JobStore.

- spark_executor/tools/external_jobs.py: 3 tool functions
- spark_executor/tools/requests.py: 3 new Pydantic body models
  (ExternalJobLogsRequest, ExternalJobStatusRequest,
  ExternalJobResultRequest)
- spark_executor/server.py: 3 new POST routes with explicit operation_id
- tests/unit/test_external_jobs.py: 7 unit tests
- tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py: assert 20 tool routes
- README.md: list the 3 new tools

To make the LLM pick the right tool and not guess at field values,
also:

- Add Pydantic field descriptions for 22 fields across 8 request models
  (SaveConnectionRequest, UpdatePendingJobRequest, GetJobLogsRequest,
  JobIdRequest, PendingIdRequest, ConnectionNameRequest, plus the new
  ExternalJob*Request models).
- Update 12 route descriptions with cross-references, prerequisite
  context, and 400 behavior notes.
- Refactor _unknown_job_error: an input that looks like a YARN
  application_id (starts with 'application_') now returns HTTP 400
  (ValueError) with a hint message naming the right external tool;
  other not-found cases still return 404 (KeyError). This catches the
  common LLM mistake of passing application_id to the internal
  get_job_* / kill_job tools.
- 4 new unit tests for the 400 behavior.

Tests: 356 passed (up from 242).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 20:03:40 +08:00
Claude e285dc0f66 feat: add README.md 2026-07-02 12:17:27 +08:00