Commit Graph
12 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 523e6a9c76 refactor(mcp): rename generate_job_file to write_job_file to match what it does
The MCP tool was named `generate_job_file` from Stage 2 but it does
NOT generate PySpark code — the calling LLM writes the code in its own
context, and this tool only persists it to a file under
SPARK_EXECUTOR_JOBS_DIR so `spark-submit` can see it. The misleading
`generate_` prefix sent agents (and humans) looking for a code
generator that doesn't exist.

This commit folds three related polish changes into one (split later
with rebase -i if you want them as separate history):

  1. The rename itself:
     - `tools/generate.py`  →  `tools/write_job.py`
     - `generate_job_file`  →  `write_job_file`
     - `GenerateJobFileRequest`  →  `WriteJobFileRequest`
     - `/generate_job_file` route  →  `/write_job_file`
     - `operation_id="generate_job_file"`  →  `operation_id="write_job_file"`
     The internal helper `core.job_writer.write_job_file` (which just
     writes bytes to disk with no SQL guard) is imported with an
     `_write_to_disk` alias to avoid the name collision with the
     MCP-exposed function in the same module.
     The description for the tool now explicitly states 'this tool
     does NOT generate PySpark code. The calling LLM is expected to
     have already written the code; this tool only persists it.'

  2. Skill for LLM agents operating the service
     (`docs/superpowers/skills/spark-executor-mcp-operate/SKILL.md`,
     449 lines). Covers the 16 tools, the two-step prepare/confirm
     flow, the dual-ID contract (job_id vs application_id), the
     PendingSubmission state machine, the Connection profile, the
     job-file workflow, the error reference, common pitfalls, and a
     full end-to-end word-count example.

  3. Default `executor_memory` lowered 4G → 2G
     (`_DEFAULTS_TO_CONFIRM` in `server.py`). Mirrors the matching
     change in `test_mcp_routes.py` and the 5 unit tests that
     reference the default. Aligns with the lighter workloads the
     service is sized for in its current container profile.

Also tracked in git for the first time:
  - `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-24-spark-executor-mcp.md`
    (the original Stage 1/2/3 design plan, updated to use the new
    tool name throughout).

Test rename:
  - `tests/unit/test_generate_tool.py`  →  `test_write_job_tool.py`
  - the new test file picks up an extra assertion that the SQL guard
    rejects a `DROP TABLE` statement at write time.

243 tests pass (was 242; +1 new SQL-guard assertion). Zero regressions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 19:13:29 +08:00
ClaudeandClaude Fable 5 565f6a9c9d feat(mcp): give every MCP tool route an explicit operation_id
fastapi-mcp uses each route's OpenAPI operationId as the MCP tool name
exposed to LLM clients (fastapi_mcp/server.py:619-620). When the
operation_id is omitted, FastAPI auto-generates a name like
`prepare_submit_job_prepare_submit_job_post` (function name + path +
method), which is verbose and ugly for the agent.

This change adds an explicit `operation_id=` to all 17 MCP tool
routes in spark_executor/server.py, named after the handler function
(stripping the leading underscore). Concretely, the LLM client now sees
tool names like `prepare_submit_job`, `confirm_submit_job`,
`get_job_status`, etc. — same as the route paths.

`/health` (the only non-MCP GET route) is left untouched; its
auto-generated name (`health_check_health_get`) is never exposed.

Also adds a regression test
`test_every_mcp_route_has_explicit_clean_operation_id` in
tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py that:
  * fetches the live OpenAPI spec,
  * asserts every MCP tool route has an operationId,
  * rejects FastAPI's auto-generated format (e.g. operationId ending
    in `_post` / `_get`),
  * asserts no two routes share an operationId (fastapi-mcp keys
    its tool registry by name, so duplicates would shadow silently).

All 226 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 17:48:45 +08:00
Claude b8826f8c90 feat(submit): update_pending_job tool for editing PENDING submissions
Add an update_pending_job MCP tool that lets callers modify parameters
of a PENDING submission before confirm_submit_job:
  - queue, executor_memory, executor_cores, num_executors
  - app_name
  - extra_args
  - script_path (re-validates file existence and SQL guard)

Only PENDING submissions can be updated; SUBMITTED/CANCELLED/FAILED are
rejected with HTTP 400.
2026-06-26 16:14:08 +08:00
Claude f170c3045b feat(submit): confirm defaults instead of removing them
Restore defaults for queue/executor_memory/executor_cores/num_executors
in prepare_submit_job, but require the caller to explicitly confirm
them. If any defaulted field is omitted, the route returns HTTP 400
listing the defaults and asks the caller to resubmit with explicit
values.

app_name remains required (no meaningful default). extra_args remains
optional.

Tests cover rejection of unconfirmed defaults and acceptance of
explicitly confirmed defaults.
2026-06-26 15:16:43 +08:00
Claude 4b07617af0 feat(submit): require explicit confirmation for all prepare_submit_job params
Remove defaults from queue, executor_memory, executor_cores,
num_executors, and app_name in prepare_submit_job. All must now be
explicitly confirmed by the caller.

Also add extra_args to the PendingSubmission snapshot so users can
confirm non-conf spark-submit flags (e.g. --jars, --py-files) at
prepare time; confirm_submit_job passes them through to
build_spark_submit_command.

This is an intentional breaking change to the MCP tool contract:
callers can no longer rely on implicit defaults.
2026-06-26 15:12:14 +08:00
Claude 35bff11edf feat: add read_job_file and update_job_file MCP tools
Closes the review-and-edit loop for LLM-generated PySpark code:

  generate_job_file(code=...)      ->  {script_path}
  read_job_file(script_path=...)   ->  {content, path, size}
  update_job_file(path, content)   ->  {path, bytes_written}
  prepare_submit_job(path)         ->  {pending_id, ...}

Or, in a single edit cycle:
  1. generate    (LLM writes initial draft)
  2. read        (LLM or human inspects)
  3. update      (overwrite with edited version)
  4. prepare     (submit for two-step confirmation)

Safety:
  - read_job_file has no path restriction (read-only; useful for
    inspecting any file the agent can see: scripts, logs/, hadoop-conf/)
  - update_job_file is sandboxed to settings.jobs_dir (the same dir
    generate_job_file writes to). Rejects paths outside that tree,
    including ../-traversal attempts. This protects host-mounted
    configs (/etc/passwd, hadoop-conf/*) from being overwritten by
    the agent.
  - 1 MB cap on both reads and writes so MCP responses stay bounded.

Pydantic body models (ReadJobFileRequest, UpdateJobFileRequest) follow
the Stage 1 pattern so tools/call roundtrips long code strings without
the FastAPI query-length 422.

Tests (13 new):
  - 9 unit tests: read success/missing/empty/dir, update success/outside/
    relative-escape/missing/oversize/1mb+1, full edit cycle round-trip
  - 4 integration tests: read via MCP, missing file 400, write+readback
    via MCP, outside-jobs_dir rejection via MCP

163/146 still pass. Live verified end-to-end: generate -> read v1
-> update -> read v2; update /etc/passwd correctly 400'd with
'script_path must be under ... data/jobs/'.
2026-06-25 13:18:39 +08:00
Claude 34e6208f54 feat: SQL safety policy (SELECT/INSERT only) at submit time
The agent can now write PySpark that runs DROP/DELETE/UPDATE/etc. on
production tables. Add a static guard that rejects anything other than
SELECT and INSERT at two enforcement points:

  1. generate_job_file: validates BEFORE writing to disk. Agent gets
     immediate feedback ('rewrite to use only SELECT/INSERT') rather
     than learning at submit time.

  2. prepare_submit_job: re-validates the script content (reads the
     file) as a defense-in-depth check. Catches host-mounted files,
     manually-edited files, anything that bypassed generate_job_file.

How it works:
  - common/sql_guard.py extracts Python string literals whose first
    keyword is a SQL verb (catches spark.sql('...'), f-strings, and any
    raw SQL literal)
  - sqlparse splits each literal into statements; we check the first
    keyword against the policy (SELECT/INSERT/WITH allowed; DROP,
    DELETE, UPDATE, TRUNCATE, ALTER, CREATE, REPLACE, MERGE, GRANT,
    REVOKE, SET, SHOW, KILL, EXEC, etc. forbidden)
  - WITH recurses into the CTE body to catch WITH x AS (DROP ...) ...
  - The MCP layer maps ValueError -> HTTP 400 (existing handler)

Test coverage:
  - 28 unit tests in test_sql_guard.py cover: extraction (single/double/
    f-string, English false positives, multi-literal), statement
    classification (SELECT, INSERT, DROP, DELETE, UPDATE, TRUNCATE,
    ALTER, CREATE, multi-statement, CTE bodies, comments)
  - 2 integration tests verify MCP layer returns 400 with the policy
    explanation at both generate_job_file and prepare_submit_job

Limitations (documented in sql_guard.py docstring):
  - f-strings where the SQL is built at runtime (e.g. f'SELECT * FROM
    {user_input}') look like SELECTs at static-analysis time. The
    guard catches the static literal; the runtime substitution is the
    caller's responsibility.
  - pyspark.sql.functions.expr('...') accepts SQL inline; not currently
    caught. (Future work.)

146/146 still pass. Live verified: DROP TABLE -> MCP 400 with policy
explanation; SELECT -> MCP 200 + file written to ./data/jobs/.
2026-06-25 12:52:16 +08:00
Claude dd197019f9 fix: validate script_path exists + tell agent to call generate_job_file
Two problems with the prior prepare_submit_job flow:

  1. The agent could pass a script_path that only existed in its own
     context (LLM-generated code not yet on disk) or a path on the host
     filesystem that's invisible inside the container. The new check
     surfaces this as a 400 with a clear remediation hint instead of
     letting spark-submit fail later with an opaque FileNotFoundError -> 500.

  2. The container-isolation issue: any path the agent gives is interpreted
     inside the container. The two ways a file can legitimately exist there
     are (a) generate_job_file(code=...) just wrote it to
     SPARK_EXECUTOR_JOBS_DIR (the default ./data/jobs/ is the only
     gitignored dir that survives restarts), or (b) a host dir was
     mounted via -v. The error message spells both out so an agent can
     self-correct.

Implementation:
  - submit.py: new _check_script_path() that raises ValueError (-> 400)
    when the path is missing, empty, or a directory. Called in both
    prepare_submit_job and confirm_submit_job (defense in depth).
  - prepare_submit_job checks the connection FIRST (KeyError -> 404)
    before the script (ValueError -> 400), so an agent with both problems
    sees the more fundamental 'unknown connection' error first.
  - server.py / requests.py: route description and Pydantic field
    description spell out the generate_job_file pattern so an LLM
    reading the tool schema learns the right next step.

8 new tests; 8 existing tests adjusted to create real files (they used
synthetic /tmp/*.py paths that don't exist).
2026-06-25 10:41:19 +08:00
Claude 994c2d67ab feat: add generate_job_file MCP tool (Stage 2 Task 22)
Exposes a single new MCP tool: generate_job_file(code) -> {script_path}.

Wiring follows the Stage 1 conventions (Pydantic body model for the
route, loguru DEBUG/INFO logging, summary+description for the startup
log, MCP arg-pattern via the body model so tools/call roundtrips long
code strings without 422-ing on FastAPI query length limits).

Flow:
  1. LLM calls generate_job_file(code=...)          -> {script_path}
  2. LLM calls prepare_submit_job(connection=...,
                                  script_path=...) -> {pending_id}
  3. User reviews the file + pending record
  4. LLM calls confirm_submit_job(pending_id=...)  -> spark-submit runs

The output directory is SPARK_EXECUTOR_JOBS_DIR (default ./data/jobs/,
gitignored, persists across container restarts via the existing
./data volume mount in docker-compose.yml).

3 new tests:
  - Unit: env-var override, default fallback in tmp cwd
  - Integration: end-to-end body call with a > FastAPI-query-limit code
    string (the canary test that would have caught the Stage 1
    query-params-422 bug)

Live MCP smoke verified: tools/list shows 14 tools (13 from Stage 1 +
the new one), tools/call generate_job_file returns the absolute path
under ./data/jobs/.
2026-06-25 10:19:59 +08:00
Claude fad296591c fix: map KeyError->404 and ValueError->400 for MCP clients
Tool functions raise KeyError for unknown ids and ValueError for invalid
state transitions. Without handlers, FastAPI returned a bare 500
"Internal Server Error" to MCP clients — useless for an agent that needs
to know whether the id was wrong vs the cluster was down.

KeyError -> 404 with the message ("Unknown job_id: foo").
ValueError -> 400 with the message (e.g. "pending_id p_xyz is in status
'CANCELLED', not PENDING").
2026-06-24 14:59:00 +08:00
Claude 6b9f278294 fix: switch FastAPI routes to Pydantic body models for MCP tools/call
The plan's route signatures used query parameters, which worked for direct
HTTP callers and unit tests, but fastapi-mcp's HTTP transport passes
tools/call arguments as a JSON body. dict-typed parameters like
spark_conf arrived as a string and the route returned 422.

Refactor each route to take a single Pydantic body model (saved in
spark_executor/tools/requests.py). Underlying tool functions unchanged.

Integration tests in tests/integration/test_mcp_routes.py now exercise
the full body-based roundtrip (save_connection with spark_conf, prepare
→ list → get, list_connections with empty body).
2026-06-24 14:56:31 +08:00
Claude cc7eafaa16 feat: register 12 MCP tools on FastAPI app 2026-06-24 14:50:51 +08:00