merge: integrate feat/auth into develop

default.conf

@@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ server {
         proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
         proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
         proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        # Explicitly forward the session cookie set by
+        # POST /api/v1/auth/login. nginx forwards it by default, but
+        # spelling it out keeps the auth contract visible.
+        proxy_set_header Cookie $http_cookie;
+        # Defense in depth: blank out the legacy identity headers so a
+        # malicious client cannot bypass the cookie-based auth flow
+        # by stuffing X-User-ID / X-Workspace-ID into the request.
+        # The backend's RequestContext no longer reads them (it
+        # derives identity from the access_token cookie), so this is
+        # belt-and-suspenders against a future regression.
+        proxy_set_header X-User-ID      "";
+        proxy_set_header X-Workspace-ID "";
     }
 
     # =========================================================================
@@ -104,6 +116,15 @@ server {
         proxy_set_header Host $host;
         proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
         proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        # Defense in depth: do not let the browser-supplied identity
+        # headers leak past the auth subrequest. The auth subrequest
+        # only forwards the Cookie + Authorization it cares about;
+        # the actual Jupyter upstream is fully trusted (the address
+        # comes from the backend's runtime registry), so a leaked
+        # X-User-ID here would not matter for the proxy target but
+        # could pollute audit logs.
+        proxy_set_header X-User-ID      "";
+        proxy_set_header X-Workspace-ID "";
     }
 
     # 2. 内部 Auth 子请求 location
@@ -123,6 +144,13 @@ server {
 
         proxy_set_header Cookie $http_cookie;
         proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
+        # Defense in depth: the auth subrequest reads the session
+        # cookie / Authorization header, not the legacy identity
+        # headers. Blank them out so a poisoned client header cannot
+        # be confused for an authenticated identity if the backend
+        # code is ever refactored to read them again.
+        proxy_set_header X-User-ID      "";
+        proxy_set_header X-Workspace-ID "";
     }
 
     # 拒绝其余非法路径