fix(security): P0-1 — port exposure + service-token auth on /internal/* + jupyter RPC

The fix lands in three concentric layers, all backed by a single
INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN shared secret so we have one mechanism
instead of three:

1. docker-compose: drop the backend.ports: 8891:8000 and
   runtime.ports: 8892:8000 mappings. Nginx is the only host
   ingress again (architecture §2.2).
2. /internal/v1/*: the storage control plane had six endpoints, five
   of which were dead code (frontend already migrated to
   /api/v1/data-resources/* with JWT; schedule only ever called
   POST /internal/v1/objects). Delete the dead routes, mount the
   one survivor with Depends(require_internal_service) that
   compares the X-Internal-Service-Token header against
   settings.internal_service_token with secrets.compare_digest.
3. POST /api/v1/jupyter on the runtime container: previously open
   inside the Docker network. Same token mechanism — backend's
   runtime_http_client now carries the header, runtime's
   handle_jupyter_action requires the same header. /api/v1/health
   stays open for the Nginx and compose healthchecks.

The schedule worker was already configured to call
POST /internal/v1/objects; build_storage_http_client now
sets the token header so its existing call site keeps working
without changes.

Files touched:
  backend/src/backend/storage_api.py   # 5 dead routes deleted + token guard
  backend/src/backend/main.py          # runtime_http_client header
  runtime/src/runtime/main.py          # require_internal_service Depends
  common/src/common/config.py          # internal_service_token setting
  schedule/src/schedule/service.py     # httpx client header
  docker-compose.yml                   # ports dropped, INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN env
  .env.example                         # INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN placeholder
  API.md / README.md / DEVELOP.md      # §9 trimmed to 1 endpoint

Verified:
  compileall -> 0 errors
  pytest backend/tests -> 37 passed
  in-process ASGI smoke:
    POST /internal/v1/objects no/wrong/correct token -> 401/401/200
    POST /api/v1/jupyter   no/wrong/correct token -> 401/401/200
    5 deleted internal routes -> 404
  docker compose config (with env) -> OK

P0-1 still has one open sub-item (rclone RC --rc-no-auth) that
the user has explicitly deferred; not touched here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

common/src/common/config.py

@@ -152,6 +152,22 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
         description="Schedule → Backend HTTP base URL (cron post-back).",
     )
 
+    # ── service-to-service auth for /internal/v1/* (P0-1 fix) ─────
+    # Shared secret between backend and the schedule worker. The schedule
+    # posts the value in the ``X-Internal-Service-Token`` header when it
+    # uploads ``run_log`` / ``run_result`` artifacts. Backend's storage
+    # API rejects requests whose header does not match this value.
+    # Override via ``INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN``; the placeholder default is
+    # safe for local dev with the matching schedule config but must be
+    # replaced in any non-dev deployment.
+    internal_service_token: str = Field(
+        default="dev-only-internal-token-not-for-production",
+        description=(
+            "Shared secret for service-to-service auth on /internal/v1/*. "
+            "Set identically on backend and schedule via INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN."
+        ),
+    )
+
     # ── runtime public base URL ──────────────────────────────────
     public_base_url: str = Field(
         default="http://runtime",